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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22(3)0) and 78-2-2(4) (2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees
Admiral and Ocwen submit their own statement of the issues on appeal. Appellees do
not cite to the record showing how each issue was preserved on appeal, as this is
Appellants' duty.
Issues
1.

Whether Appellants' appeal should be dismissed for their failure to show

how the issues raised in their appeal were preserved in the trial court?
2.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of

Admiral and Ocwen based, in part, upon the election of remedies doctrine and issuing an
order of sale and decree of foreclosure of the subject property on the ground that
Appellants waived their right to contest the validity of the deed of trust executed by
Epley by obtaining and collecting a judgment against Epley?
3.

Whether the trial court erred in affirming the December 15,1998 Order and

ruling Appellants' claims for the return of the property were moot, when Appellants:
a.

failed to post a supersedeas bond and or obtain a stay of execution of

the December 15,1998 Order;
b.

allowed the sheriff's sale to take place as scheduled;

c.

made no attempt to redeem the subject property before the expiration

of the six-month redemption period;
d.

purposefully failed and refused to notice up their motions relating to

the December 15,1998 order and foreclosure sale and;
e.
4.

allowed the subject property to be sold to a bona fide purchaser?

Whether the sheriff's sale held pursuant to Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure extinguished all rights and interests of Appellants in and to the subject
property?
5.

Whether Appellants' participation and acquiescence in Epley's forging of

her deceased father's name to a quit-claim deed prevent Appellants from benefiting from
such forgery?
Standard of Review
This is an appeal from a trial court order awarding summary judgment in Admiral
and Ocwen's favor and denying summary judgment for Appellants. This is also an
appeal from subsequent refusals of the trial court to alter, annend, or clarify the terms of
the order awarding summary judgment in Admiral and Ocwen's favor and denying
summary judgment for Appellants.
Upon review of a grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court
reviews the trial court's rulings for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court.
See In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997). The appellate court considers
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no

disputed issues of material fact existed. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99,418
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, f7; Kessler v. Mortenson, 2000 UT 95,410 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, \5.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no determinative constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
On June 1,1995, Admiral loaned $55,000 to Defendant Epley secured by a first
deed of trust against a Provo, Utah residence. Admiral then sold the note and deed of
trust to Ocwen. Appellants are relatives of Epley and brought this litigation against
Epley, her friend Reisser, and Admiral. In their Complaint, Appellants claimed title to
the Provo, Utah property as heirs of their father's estate. Appellants further claimed
Epley improperly granted the deed of trust to Admiral because she allegedly obtained
title to the property by forging her deceased father's name to a prior quit-claim deed.
Appellants now challenge the deed of trust's validity and enforceability.
Shortly after obtaining the loan, Epley defaulted for failure to make monthly
payments and pay property taxes, and Admiral filed a crossclaim seeking judicial
foreclosure of the deed of trust. Ocwen was substituted in as the holder of the note and
beneficial interest under the deed of trust and brought a motion for summary judgment
for the full amount owed under the note and for foreclosure of the deed of trust.
Appellants objected to Ocwen's motion and filed a cross motion for summary judgment.

Before a ruling on the motions, Admiral and Ocwen learned through discovery
that Appellants had obtained a default judgment against Epley for the loss of the property
and had collected substantial sums of money from Epley on the judgment. Ocwen and
Admiral also learned that Appellants had participated in and acquiesced to the very acts
of forgery Appellants complained of. Based upon this new information, Admiral and
Ocwen amended their Answer, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim and filed a second motion
for summary judgment based upon the election of remedies doctrine. Determining the
deed of trust executed by Epley to be a valid and enforceable first lien against the
property, on December 15,1998, the trial court granted Admiral and Ocwen's motion and
entered a decree of foreclosure and order for sale of the property.
Shortly before the sheriffs sale, Appellants filed three motions with the trial court.
Appellants specifically asked the trial court for an order clarifying the December 15,
1998 Order, altering or amending the December 15,1998 Order, or in the alternative,
certifying the December 15,1998 Order for immediate appeal Having the ability and
wherewithal to notice up these motions, Appellants purposefully failed and refused to
timely submit them for hearing before the sheriffs sale held on February 10,1999.
On August 10,1999, the date that the six-month statutory redemption period
expired, Appellants filed a fourth motion, this time seeking to set aside the foreclosure
sale, or in the alternative, to enlarge the redemption period. Appellants then waited until
ten months after the sheriffs sale to notice up this motion and the three motions
previously filed. Appellants later withdrew their request for hearing. Ocwen requested
Appellants' motions be noticed up for ruling by the trial court. Although it was Ocwen's

position the motions had been rendered moot by the sheriff's sale and the expiration of
the statutory redemption period, Ocwen requested the hearing to bringfinalityto the case.
Appellants objected to the request for hearing on their own motions and a hearing was
never scheduled.
Nearly a year later and twenty months after the sheriffs sale, Ocwen attempted for
a second time to notice up Appellants' motions and a hearing was finally held on
December 13, 2001. During the hearing the trial court unequivocally denied all of
Appellants' motions, ruling that the sheriff's sale was valid and enforceable and that the
redemption period had expired long ago. This ruling was incorporated into the trial
court's order dated January 16,2001. On February 15, 2001, Appellants filed their notice
of appeal from the January 16,2001 Order.
Statement of the Facts
1.

On June 1,1995, Admiral loaned $55,000 to Epley. (R. at 434.)

2.

The loan was evidenced by a promissory note dated June 1,1995 executed

by Epley in favor of Admiral (the "Note").
3.

The Note was secured by a first deed of trust (the "Trust Deed") against

certain real property and the improvements thereon located at approximately 42 South
700 West, Provo, Utah County, Utah, more particularly described as:
Commencing 150.14 feet South of the Northeast corner of Block 59, Plat
"A", Provo City Survey of Building Lots; thence West 6 rods; thence South
3 rods, more or less to the South line of Lot 7, Block 59; thence East along
said South line 6 rods to Southeast corner of said Lot 7; thence North 3
rods, more or less to beginning.
(the "Property"). (R. at 433-34.)

4.

On June 5, 1995, only four days after the loan memorialized by the Note

was made, Admiral sold the Note and Trust Deed to Ocwen. (R. at 266,433.)
5.

Ocwen purchased pools of loans from Admiral and other lenders and

recorded the assignments after a block or group of loans had been purchased. Consistent
with this practice the Note Allonge and Assignment of the Deed of Trust were recorded
in the official records of Utah County on November 9,1995. (R. at 433.)
6.

Fidelity National Title Insurance Company insured the Trust Deed on June

8,1995, as a valid and perfected first lien and encumbrance against the Property. (R. at
433.)
7.

According to the official records of Utah County, at the time Epley

executed the Note and Trust Deed against the Property, Epley was the record fee simple
owner of the Property. (R. at 432,440.)
8.

Specifically, the chain of title to the Property at the time Epley executed the

Note and Trust Deed against the Property reflected the following:
a.

Recordation on May 31, 1994, of a Quit-Claim Deed dated August

17,1993, naming Clarence G. Carrillo, as grantor, in favor of Clarence G.
Carrillo, Trustee, and the Successor Trustees of the Clarence G. Carrillo
Trust dated August 17,1993, as grantees, (R. at 438.);
b.

Recordation on May 11,1995, of a Quit-Claim Deed dated May 11,

1995, naming Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley, Successor Trustee of The Clarence
G. Carrillo Trust dated August 17,1993, as grantor, in favor of Lydia Inez
Carrillo Epley, as grantee, (R. at 437.); and

c.

Recordation on June 8, 1995, of a Quit-Claim Deed dated June 2,

1995, naming Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley, as grantor, in favor of Lydia I.
Epley, as grantee (R. at 431.)
(collectively the "Quit-Claim Deeds").
9.

At the time Ocwen acquired the Note and Trust Deed from Admiral,

Admiral and Ocwen had no notice of any claim or dispute concerning Epley's ownership
of the Property or any issue concerning the validity or enforceability of the Trust Deed.
(R. at 432.)
10.

On July 27,1995, approximately two months after the Note and Trust Deed

were executed, Appellants Yvonne Loraine Carrillo Taylor, Patricia Ann Carrillo Davis,
and Alexander James Carrillo brought this action against their sister Epley, her friend
Reisser, and Admiral. Ocwen was later joined as a defendant. (R. at 1-15.)
11.

In their Complaint, Appellants claimed title to the Property as heirs of their

father's estate. Appellants further claimed Epley improperly granted the Trust Deed to
Admiral through forgery of her deceased father's name to the Quit-Claim Deeds. (R. at
1-15.)
12.

In conjunction with the lawsuit, approximately three months after the Note

and Trust Deed were executed, on September 19,1995, Appellants filed a lis pendens
against the Property.
13.

On May 28,1996, default judgment was entered against Reisser and in

favor of Appellants in an amount totaling $60,029.55, which included $55,000 principal,

$4,852.05 accrued interest, and $177.00 costs, amounts directly related to the Note and
Trust Deed. (R. at 171-73.)
14.

On July 3,1996, default judgment was entered against Epley in favor of

Appellants in an amount totaling $81,079.83, which included $55,000 principal,
$4,852.05 accrued interest, $527.78 accrued costs, and $5,700 attorneys' fees, amounts
directly related to the Note and Trust Deed. This judgment also included $15,000 for
punitive damages. (R. at 187-95.)
15.

Both default judgments, which were prepared by Appellants' counsel,

treated the Trust Deed as voidable and awarded money damages to Appellants for the
loss of the Property in amounts directly related to the amount evidenced by the Note and
secured by the Trust Deed. Neither judgment declared the Trust Deed to be null, void or
without force or effect. (R. at 171-73 and 187-95.)
16.

Shortly after executing the Note, Epley defaulted by failing to make the

payments owing thereunder on November 1,1995, and on the first day of each month
thereafter. Epley further defaulted on the Note by failing to pay the 1995 and 1996 taxes
assessed against the Property. (R. at 432.)
17.

As a result of Epley's defaults, Ocwen accelerated the indebtedness and

declared the entire amount of the Note, including principal and accrued interest, to be due
and payable. (R. at 431.)
18.

Additionally, Ocwen filed a motion for summary judgment seeking

judgment against Epley for the entire amount owing under the Note; judgment declaring
the Deed of Trust executed by Epley to be a valid and enforceable first lien against the

Property; and judicial foreclosure of the Property barring Appellants and Epley from any
right, title, interest, lien, or estate in and to the Property, or any part thereof. (R. at 388408.)
19.

Appellants objected to Ocwen's motion and filed a cross motion for

summary judgment seeking to have the Trust Deed declared a forgery and to be null,
void, and without force or effect. (R. at 443-47.)
20.

Before a ruling on the motions, counsel for Ocwen took the deposition of

Epley. During the deposition, Ocwen and Admiral learned that Appellants had collected
substantial sums of money from Epley on the default judgment entered against her for
loss of the Property. (R. at 697-703,706-15; Epley Dep. at 43:24-44:19; 120:17-132:15;
147:20-148:16, which is attached hereto as an addendum.) Specifically, Ocwen and
Admiral learned that:
a.

Appellants had garnished the wages of Epley at the rate of $208.00

per paycheck and had collected more than $5,383.39 towards their
judgment and possibly $20,000 with continuing garnishments. In fact,
garnishment papers total approximately half of the court pleadings filed in
this matter with the trial court. (R. at 702, 708-09,714; Epley Dep. at
147:20-148:16.)
b.

Appellants and Epley had agreed that Appellant Alexander James

Carrillo, who was living in the home on the Property, would pay $125 per
month as rental to each of the others, but Alexander James Carrillo had not
paid such rental to Epley. As of August 1997, Epley was owed at least

$3,250 in past rental and possibly more. (R. at 702,710-11,714; Epley
Dep. at 43:24-44:19.)
c.

Appellants had required Epley to convey to them by quit-claim deed

her interest in the Property. Based upon an appraisal of the Property on
May 25,1995, and inflationary increases since then, Epley's interest in the
Property was worth more than $25,000. (R. at 702, 706, 714.)
21.

During Epley's deposition Ocwen and Admiral further learned that

Appellants participated in and acquiesced to Epley's forging of their deceased father's
name to a quit-claim deed. (R. at 838,1445, p. 4.); (Epley Dep. at 120:17-132:15.)
22.

Based upon the new information learned in Epley's deposition, on March

30,1998, Admiral and Ocwen amended their Answer, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim,
and on May 8,1998, filed a second motion for summary judgment based upon the
election of remedies doctrine. (R. at 833-42 and 859-85.)
23.

On September 29, 1998 and November 16,1998 respectively, the trial court

issued two Memorandum Decisions granting Admiral and Ocwen's Motions for
Summary Judgment based upon the election of remedies doctrine and denying all other
pending motions. (R. at 959-64 and 1016-19.)
24.

These Memorandum Decisions were incorporated into two orders entered

by the trial court. First, the Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale entered
by the trial court on December 14,1998, that determined the Trust Deed executed by
Epley was a valid and enforceable first lien against the Property and ordered a decree of
foreclosure and sale of the Property (R. at 1033-38.) The trial court entered a second

order entitled Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on December 15,1998. (R. at 1039-42.)
25.

A sheriff's sale of the Property was scheduled for February 10,1999.

26.

On December 24,1998, in an apparent effort to stop the sheriff's sale,

Appellants filed three motions with the trial court. (R. at 1043-45.) Appellants
specifically asked the trial court:
a.

For an order clarifying its December 15,1998 Order, or in the

alternative, for an order determining the percentage interest of the Property
affected by the foreclosure;
b.

For an order altering or amending its December 15,1998 Order; and

c.

For an order certifying its December 15,1998 Order for immediate

appeal.
27.

Appellants failed to notice up these motions so the trial court could rule on

them before the sheriffs sale on February 10,1999.
28.

As regularly scheduled, the sheriff's sale took place on February 10,1999,

at which Ocwen purchased the Property for a credit bid of $85,000. The sheriff's sale
was also attended by Appellants who made no attempt to submit a bid on the Property.
29.

On August 10,1999, following the expiration of the six-month statutory

redemption period, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure Sale, or
Alternatively, to Enlarge the Redemption Period. (R. at 1136-42.)

30.

On November 22, 1999, ten months after the sheriffs sale, Appellants

finally filed a Request for Hearing on the above motion and the three motions filed by
Appellants approximately a year earlier. (R. at 1223-25.)
31.

Shortly thereafter, Appellants withdrew their Request for Hearing. (R. at

1229-31.)
32.

On December 20,1999, Ocwen filed a Request for Hearing asking the

trial court to schedule Appellants' motions for hearing. This request was made to bring
finality to the case even though Ocwen did not believe there were any pending motions
that had not already been ruled on or rendered moot by the sheriffs sale. (R. at 1238-40.)
33.

Appellants objected to Ocwen's Request for Hearing on Appellants' own

motions. As a result, no hearing was scheduled. (R. at 1241-43.)
34.

On October 31, 2000, nearly twenty months after the sheriffs sale, Ocwen

tried again to bring finality to the case by filing a second Request for Ruling on all
pending motions before the trial court. (R. at 1323-26.)
35.

A hearing was held on December 13, 2000 from which the trial court issued

a written Ruling denying all of Appellants' pending motions. (R. at 1355-58.) This
Ruling was incorporated into the order entered on January 16, 2001 and a Minute Entry
entered January 18, 2001. (R. at 1365-67 and 1370-72.)
36.

In its Ruling and Order, the trial court specifically denied all of Appellants'

motions, ruled that the sheriffs sale held on February 10,1999 was valid and enforceable
and held that the redemption period expired on August 10,1999, six months after the
sheriff's sale. (R. at 1365-67 and 1370-72.)
n

37.

On February 15, 2001, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from the

January 16, 2001 Order. (R. at 1382-84.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should dismiss Appellants' appeal for failure to show how the issues
raised in their appeal were preserved in the trial court. In their opening brief, Appellants
fail to include citation to the record showing how each issue was preserved or a statement
indicating why Appellants seek review of issues not preserved in the trial court.
If this Court concludes Appellants sufficiently preserved the issues raised on
appeal, the Court should nevertheless affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment
granted in Admiral and Ocwen's favor and affirm the decree of foreclosure and order of
sale of the Property.
Specifically, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Appellants
elected their remedy by treating the Trust Deed as voidable and obtaining and collecting a
judgment against Epley for amounts directly related to the Trust Deed. Furthermore, the
trial court correctly ruled that the post-judgment motions filed by Appellants, in which
Appellants sought to have the summary judgment award overturned and the sheriffs sale
set aside, are moot. Appellants purposefully failed and refused for nearly two years to
notice up their motions for ruling by the trial court. As a result, the sheriffs sale took
place as scheduled, the redemption period expired, and the Property was sold to a bona
fide purchaser. Third, this Court should further affirm the trial court's ruling that the
sheriff's sale was a valid and enforceable sale that extinguished all rights and interests of
Appellants in and to the Property. Lastly, Appellants have unclean hands because they

participated and acquiesced in the very acts of forgery they complain of, specifically their
sister, Defendant Epley's forgery of their deceased father's name to a trust agreement and
quit-claim deed, and accordingly Appellants should not profit as a result of such acts.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW HOW THE ISSUES RAISED IN
THEIR APPEAL WERE PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellants

are required to include in their opening brief "a statement of the issues presented for
review." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Appellants are further required to include "citation to
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or a "statement of
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Id.
In their opening brief, Appellants list four issues presented for review on appeal.
However, Appellants fail to include appropriate citation to the record showing how each
issue was preserved in the trial court or a statement indicating why Appellants seek
review of issues not preserved below. Furthermore, Appellants include no citation to the
record throughout their entire opening brief, including no citation to the record for the
statement of the facts and proceedings below as is required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) ("All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.").
Accordingly, Admiral and Ocwen ask that Appellants' appeal be dismissed for
failure to strictly comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II.

APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM RECOVERING THE PROPERTY
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
Appellants have elected their remedy in this matter by obtaining afinaljudgment on

the merits against Epley and collecting on that judgment, and thus they are now precluded
from recovering the Property. Under Utah law, the doctrine of election of remedies is
"a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine
presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, and knowledgeable
selection of one thereof,freeoffraudor imposition, and a resort to the chosen
remedy evincing a purpose to forego all others."
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059,1061-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Angelos v. First
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772,778 (Utah 1983) (quotation omitted))1.

As demonstrated by Palmer, Utah recognizes the doctrine of election of remedies
notwithstanding Appellants' suggestion to the contrary in their Brief. See also Dugan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1247 (Utah 1980); Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery Ctr.f
Inc., 613 P.2d 510,512 (Utah 1980); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah
1979). In addition, while Rule 8(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to
pursue inconsistent claims, it does not allow a party to have a double recovery for the same
loss and so does not invalidate the doctrine of election of remedies. See Brigham City Sand
<fc Grave/, 613 P.2d at 511.

A.

The Remedies Appellants Seek are Inconsistent, Because the Facts on which
Each Remedy Relies are Inconsistent.

Appellants are barred from recovering the Property because that remedy presumes
that title to the Property lies in them while their judgment for money damages presumes that
Epley or her successors have title. The election of remedies doctrine
applies as a bar only where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based
upon incompatible facts; the doctrine does not operate as an estoppel where
the two or more remedies are given to redress the same wrong and are
consistent. Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of
one that bars the other; but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that
operates as a bar.
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 289 P.2d 1045,1049 (Utah
1955) (citations omitted).
In Hoskins v. Smith, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment for $2,500 against the
defendant on the ground that the defendant had perpetrated a fraud upon him. 233 P. 279,
279-80 (Wash. 1925). Later, the plaintiff brought an action seeking to have the defendant's
declaration of homestead declared null and void on the ground that the property claimed as
the homestead was purchased with funds fraudulently acquired from the plaintiff. Id. at
279. The defendant contended that by bringing his action for general damages, the plaintiff
had waived his right to impress a trust and had made an election as to his remedy. Id. at
280.
Agreeing with the defendant, the court stated that
we have followed the well-established rule that one who has the right to
impress a trust may either bring an action for damages or an action to impress
a trust; that the bringing of either is an election as to the remedy; and that, if
the action be brought for damages and a general judgment obtained, no right
exists thereunder to set aside a homestead.
IA

(a)

Id. (citations omitted). The court found that at the time the plaintiff
brought his suit for damages, he knew that a fraud had been committed upon
him, that the property out of which he claimed he was defrauded had been
transferred to an innocent purchaser, and therefore he had two remedies open
to him — to impress a trust upon the proceeds of the property wherever
found, or to bring an action for damages. Having chosen his action in law for
damages, he may not now sue for equitable relief.

Id. Thus, the plaintiff was barredfrompursuing the property. Id.; see also Hussey v.
Bryant, 49 A. 56,56 (Me. 1901) (stating that plaintiff could waive alleged defects in
condemnation proceeding and obtain just compensation for her land or could take advantage
of irregularities in proceedings, regard land as still her property, and maintain trespass for
any injury to her possession thereof, but she could not do both).
Similarly, in Sannini v. Casscells, a saleswoman purchased for herself property that
was being actively sought by the plaintiffs as her broker's customers. 401 A.2d 927,928
(Del. 1979). The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the saleswoman imposing a
constructive trust on the property and ordering her to reconvey it to the plaintiffs
conditioned upon the plaintiffs tendering to her such portion of the purchase price and
settlement costs that she had previously paid. Id. The plaintiffs did not remit payment to
the saleswoman because the rental market for the property had deteriorated since their cause
of action arose, which prevented them from obtaining financing to acquire title to the
property. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that "because their inability to obtainfinancingmeant
that they were not left in status quo ante, they should be awarded damages as an alternative
remedy." Mat930.

In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court noted that when their cause of action
arose, the plaintiffs
had the choice of proceeding in equity to impress a constructive trust on the
property or at law for damages. The equitable remedy proceeds on the
theory that title to the property lies in the plaintiffs and that the defendants
simply hold the property as constructive trustees for the plaintiffs; the legal
remedy for damages proceeds on the assumption that title to the property is
in the defendants.
Id. at 931. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the two remedies are irreconcilably
inconsistent, the choice of [the plaintiffs] to proceed in equity to impress a constructive
trust constituted an election of remedies, and the pursuit of that choice to final judgment
now precludes them from seeking damages." Id. Moreover, the deterioration of the
rental value of the property did not permit the plaintiffs to "turn this typical equity case
into a law suit for damages." Id. The court concluded by stating that "having elected to
disaffirm the sale of the property to [the defendants] by pressing the equity remedy to the
constructive trust end, [the plaintiffs] may not now seek to affirm the transaction by
seeking money damages." Id.
As in Hoskins and SanninU Appellants had the choice of either proceeding in
equity to have the Quit-Claim Deeds and Trust Deed declared null and void, or at law for
money damages. Appellants chose to pursue their legal remedy for money damages,
which proceeded on the assumption that the Quit-Claim Deeds had effectively conveyed
title to Defendant Epley and that the Trust Deed was a valid lien on the Property. As the
trial court recognized, the judgment against Defendant Epley was "directly related to the
amount of the loan made by Admiral to Epley — which loan was secured by the property

which is the subject of this action." (R. at 1040.) The $81,079.83 judgment entered was
expressly for $55,000 principal (the amount of the Note and Trust Deed to Admiral),
$4,852.05 interest thereon calculated from June 1,1995 (the date that the Note and Trust
Deed were executed), and $15,000 punitive damages plus attorney's fees and costs.
Because the judgment sought by Appellants compensated them for the loss of the Property
in amounts closelytiedto the Trust Deed, it is clear that Appellants assumed for purposes of
said judgment thattitleto the Property was in Epley. As such, it is irreconcilably
inconsistent for Appellants to now claim thattitleto the Property is in them. See Dugan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1243 (Utah 1980) ('The Joneses by electing to seek damages, rather
than rescission, have affirmed the underlying mortgage and note."). They cannot elect to
affirm the Quit-Claim Deeds and Trust Deed by seeking money damages for the Property's
loss and then seek to disaffirm the transfer and encumbrance of the Property by attacking
the validity of the very same documents.
B.

Final Judgment on Appellants' Claim for Money Damages Bars Them from
Seeking the Return of the Property.

On a related issue, since the remedies sought by Appellants are predicated on two
inconsistent sets of facts involvingtitleto the Property, satisfaction of the judgment is not
what bars Appellants from pursuing an alternative remedy. As the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized: "Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of one that bars
the other; but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that operates as a bar."
Farmers & Merchants, 289 P.2d at 1049. At the latest, an election occurs when "a plaintiff
has obtained a viable judgment on one of the claims." Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 745

A.2d 972,975 (Me. 2000). In Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., the Utah
Supreme Court tacitly recognized this principle when it stated: "It is noteworthy that,
except for the stipulation[2], had plaintiff chosen to take judgment against Gibralter, such
may well have been viewed as an election of remedies, and if properly raised as a defense, it
would have obviated the necessity of trial and this appeal." 603 P.2d 793,796 (Utah 1979).
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 165 So. 764 (Ala. 1936), the case cited by
Appellants to support their claim that they are not barred from seeking recovery of the
Property until they have satisfied their money judgment, is inaipposite.3 Sloss-Sheffield
discusses the methods by which a mortgagee may protect its interest in mortgaged property
that has been damaged by a third party. Id. at 767. As Appellants point out, the case holds
that a mortgagee may maintain an action against the third party for damages, for a personal
judgment against the debtor, or for foreclosure. Id. All of these remedies, however, are
based upon the same, consistent set of facts. There is no dispute as to who hastitleto or a
security interest in the property in Sloss-Sheffield. By contrast, in the instant matter
Appellants cannot recover money damages without assuming thattitleto the Property is in
Epley, a set of facts that is entirely inconsistent with Appellants' current action to recover

2

The parties in Royal Resources had entered into a stipulation whereby the plaintiff was

permitted to take judgment against Gibralter, and in the event of no recovery, to then
proceed against two other defendants individually.
3

In addition, Sloss-Sheffield has been overruled by Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel

Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980).

the Property, which assumes an entirely different set of facts centered on the notion that title
is in Appellants.
Likewise, Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery Center, Inc., 613 P.2d 510
(Utah 1980), does not support Appellants' position. In Brigham City, the plaintiffs claimed
that their property, worth $12,000, had been converted and sold by several defendants, the
Jensens, to the defendant Machinery Center for $8,500. Id. at 511. The plaintiffs sought
both damages against the Jensens for the value of the converted property and return of the
property from Machinery Center. Id. The plaintiffs settled their damage claim against the
Jensens for $2,500. Id. Afterward, Machinery Center moved to dismiss the claim for
recovery of the property on the ground that the plaintiffs "had elected their remedy of
accepting $2,500 damages for the conversion of their property and, having thus been paid
for it, they were precluded from also seeking its return." Id.
Contrary to Appellants' assertion that the plaintiffs' settlement payment of $2,500
constituted full satisfaction of its claim that resulted in the dismissal of the alternative claims
against Machinery Center for recovery of the property, the plaintiffs settled their claims for
damages for only $2,500 (20% of their total claim) and they reserved in that settlement their
rights to recover the converted property from Machinery Center. The Utah Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs could not "recover for the value of [their] property (as plaintiffs did
from the Jensens here) through whom defendant Machinery Center derived its title, and then
recover the property from the latter." Id. at 512 (emphasis added). In other words, the
plaintiffs did not recover the value of the property ($12,000). They recovered only $2,500
"for" the value of the property. Moreover, the reservation of rights did not prevent the

application of the doctrine of election of remedies. Having elected to accept $2,500 for the
value of the property, the plaintiffs were barredfromrecovering the property itselffromthe
innocent purchaser of that property.
Thus, even Brigham City Sand & Gravel demonstrates that it is not the satisfaction
of Appellants' damage claim that bars the alternative claim for recovery of the property.
Rather, it is the election of the damage remedy (whether by settlement or by taking a
judgment) that bars the alternative claim for recovery of the property. Satisfaction did not
occur in Brigham City Sand & Gravel and it need not occur here in order for the doctrine of
election of remedies to bar Appellants' claim for the recovery of the Property. The fact that
a plaintiff is able to collect only a fraction of his judgment is not relevant in determining
whether an election of remedies has been made. See Royal Resources, 603 P.2d at 796
(recognizing that had plaintiff elected to take judgment against corporation instead of
individuals it probably would have been barred by doctrine of election of remedies from
pursuing them despite fact that judgment against corporation "was of little or no value").
C.

Appellants' Recovery of the Property would Constitute Double Recovery.

Appellants should not be allowed to recover the Property because the judgment and
the Property represent compensation for the same loss suffered by Appellants. It is well
settled under Utah law that one of the primary purposes of the doctrine of election of
remedies is "'to prevent double redress for a single wrong.'" Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d
1059,1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772,
778 (Utah 1983)).

In Brigham City Sand & Gravel, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "the trial
court correctly took the view that the matter of terminology should be disregarded and the
transaction looked at for what it actually was: that what the plaintiffs were suing the Jensens
for was conversion of their property; and that the settlement agreement stated" that the
parties' claims had been fully adjusted and compromised on the merits. 613 P.2d at 512.
Noting that the doctrine of election of remedies is based upon principles of equity and
justice, the court held that "[i]t would be plainly contrary to those principles to allow a party
to recover for the value of his property (as plaintiffs did from the Jensens here) through
whom defendant Machinery Center derived its title, and then recover the property from the
latter." Id. Thus, having elected to accept the $2,500 from the Jensens, the plaintiffs were
precluded from pursuing the property in the hands of the defendant Machinery Center. Id.
Similarly, Appellants admit that they have obtained a judgment against Epley "based
upon her fraud." (Appellants Br. at 5) (emphasis added.) They further admit that
"regardless of whether plaintiffs obtain the relief they seek against Admiral and Ocwen
regarding the cloud on the title to the Property, the amount of the judgment plaintiffs have
obtained against Lydia Epley will not be abated." (Appellants Br. at 6) (emphasis added.)
That judgment includes $55,000 for the amount of the Trust Deed against the Property to
Admiral and Ocwen. If the Trust Deed is removed, the Property would no longer be subject
to that $55,000 lien and the $55,000 included in the judgment, which would not be abated,
would represent a recovery of the same $55,000 twice. That is double recovery and
constitutes inconsistent remedies. No statement by Appellants to the contrary can change
those facts.

Moreover, Appellants, in collecting on their judgment, recovered approximately
$35,000 from Epley, their judgment debtor, prior to the judgment from which this appeal
was taken. This included having obtained a conveyance of Epley's full 25% interest in the
Property quit-claimed to Appellants at a hearing on an Order in Supplemental Proceedings
under Rule 69(k) and (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That 25% interest is worth at
least $25,000. Appellants have been collecting on the judgment since its entry (garnishment
papers constituting approximately one-half of the district courtfile)and their efforts may
well result in full recovery. Thus, a nullification of the Trust Deed, giving Appellants full
unencumbered ownership of the Property as well as damages, would clearly represent a
double recovery, which necessitates the application of the doctrine of election of remedies.
in.

THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANTS ARE MOOT AND BARRED BY
THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
The sheriff's sale held nearly three years ago and the expiration of the redemption

period has rendered any issue with respect to the judgment entered by the trial court moot
and barred by the doctrine of laches. The Property has been sold to a bona fide third
party and cannot now be regained in order to provide the re lief requested by Appellants
in this appeal.
In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., a situation similar to the
case at hand, a seller of an apartment complex sought to foreclose on a contract of sale.
659 P.2d 1040,1042 (Utah 1983). The trial court grantedtitleseller summary judgment
and ordered a decree of foreclosure and sale of the property. Id. The buyers filed notices
of appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond or obtain a stay of the judgment and, as a

result, the foreclosure sale took place as scheduled. Id. at 1043. On appeal, the sellers
argued the appeal should be dismissed as moot because the foreclosure sale had already
been carried out and the redemption period had expired. Id.
In ruling on the matter, the Utah Supreme Court held "[a]n appeal is moot if
during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is
eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." Id.
The court further held "if appellants were seeking on this appeal to prevent the
foreclosure sale, and because of their failure to obtain a stay of execution, the sale were
legally carried out during the pendency of the appeal and the time for redemption had
run, the appeal would be moot." Id.; see also Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057,
1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("A case is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the
rights of the litigants."); Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409,411 (Utah 1982)
(same) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, in Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs.,
the Utah Supreme Court held a claim on appeal may be barred by the doctrine of laches if
there is a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff which results in injury to the
defendant. See 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). In applying the doctrine of laches to
foreclosure sales, parties having an interest in the subject property "must redeem or assert
any other available remedies within a reasonable time after the sale i.e., before the
defense of laches becomes available to the purchaser." David A. Thomas & James H.
Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law §14.03(c)(2)(iii)(A) (1999).
See also 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 911 (1996) ("[T]he right to redeem may be lost by

laches unless asserted within a reasonable time, and before the situation of the parties has
changed, and the rights of others have intervened

").

In the case at hand, the trial court granted summary judgment in Admiral and
Ocwen's favor on December 15,1998, ruling the Trust Deed executed by Epley was a
valid and enforceable first lien against the Property and ordering a decree of foreclosure
and order of sale of the Property. Under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellants had thirty days to appeal the trial court's final order of summary
judgment, but chose not to. Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("[T]he notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.").
Instead, on December 24,1998, apparently in an effort to stop the sheriffs sale,
Appellants filed three motions with the trial court. Particularly, Appellants asked the trial
court (1) to clarify its December 15,1998 Order, (2) to alter, or amend the order, or (3) to
certify the order for immediate appeal. Appellants made no attempt to protect the
Property by posting a supersedeas bond or obtaining a stay of enforcement of the order,
which is allowed pursuant to Rule 62(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule
8(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 62(b) ("[T]he court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to
Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60 . . .
."); Utah R. App. P. 8(a) ("A motion for [a stay of the judgment or for approval of a
supersedeas bond] may be made to the appellate court.").

After filing the motions and having the ability and wherewithal to notice up the
motions, Appellants failed and refused to submit the motions to the trial court for ruling.
As a result, the trial court could not hear and rule on the motions before the sheriffs sale,
which took place as originally scheduled on February 10,1999. At the sheriffs sale
Ocwen purchased the Property and later resold it to a bona fide third party, who is
entitled to retain the Property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(6) ("If no redemption is made
within six months after the sale, the purchaser or the purchaser's assignee is entitled to a
conveyance.").
During the six-month statutory redemption period Appellants had ample
opportunity to redeem the Property, as is allowed by Rule 69(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, but elected not to. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j). Instead, on August 10,1999, the
last day of the redemption period, Appellants filed a fourth motion, this time seeking to
set aside the sheriffs sale or alternatively to enlarge the redemption period. Appellants,
however, made no attempt to expedite the noticing up of this motion, or the three motions
previously filed, so the trial court could properly rule and decide the issues before the
expiration of the redemption period.
Finally, ten months after the sheriffs sale and nearly a year after the December 15,
1998 decree of foreclosure and order of sale had been issued, Appellants noticed up their
four outstanding motions. Shortly thereafter, Appellants withdrew the request. As a
result, Ocwen then requested Appellants motions be submitted to the trial court for
ruling. Although it was Ocwen's position that all of the motions had been rendered moot
by the sheriffs sale and the expiration of the statutory redemption period, Ocwen

requested the hearing to bring finality to the case. Surprisingly, Appellants then objected
to the noticing up of their own motions and a hearing was never set.
Nearly a year later and twenty months after the sheriffs sale, Ocwen attempted for
a second time to notice up Appellants' motions and a hearing was finally held on
December 13, 2000. During that hearing the trial court judge commented at length on the
mootness of Appellants' motions.4 Shortly after the hearing the trial court issued its
Ruling, in which the trial court denied all of Appellants' motions holding that such were
invalid, ineffective, and moot.5
On this appeal, Appellants seek to have the Trust Deed invalidated and the
Property returned to them. However, by not posting a supersedeas bond and obtaining a
stay of the foreclosure order, by allowing the foreclosure sale to take place as scheduled,

4

Specifically, the trial court judge noted as follows:
THE JUDGE: Counsel,... I will tell you not to hold your, not to exercise
too much hope, Mr. Brown, because it strikes me that if the sale has taken
place and the redemption period run, and the property has now been
transferred to a third party, at some point there's got to be finality . . . But
don't hold your breath. All right?

(R. at 1445, p. 18-19.)
5

In its Ruling, the trial court specifically stated as follows:
Plaintiffs' appeal period has expired and its efforts to seek some relief from
a foreclosure sale also is moot. The sale was held nearly two years ago and
the redemption period expired way over a year ago. Plaintiffs' claims are
moot.

(R. at 1357.)

by making no attempt to redeem the Property before expiration of the redemption period,
by purposefully refusing and failing to notice up their motions for ruling for nearly two
years and by allowing the Property to be sold to a bona fide third party, Appellants have
failed to diligently take all steps necessary to preserve the return of the Property as a
possible remedy on appeal. Even if the return of the Property were a possible remedy,
doing so would work a manifest injustice to the bona fide third party who purchased the
Property after the sheriffs sale held nearly three years ago. Accordingly, this Court
cannot provide the relief requested by Appellants and must deny their claims as moot and
barred by the doctrine of laches.
For convenience of the Court, Appellees submit the following table which sets
forth in short form the dates and events that clearly demonstrate the mootness of
Appellants' appeal:

TSvlOCI

1

1
Date
December 14,1998
December 15, 1998
December 24,1998
February 10,1999
August 10,1999
August 10,1999
November 22,1999
December 8,1999
December 20, 1999
December 21,1999
October 31, 2000
December 13, 2000
December 13, 2000
January 16, 2001
i February 15, 2001
IV.

Event
Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale entered by
the trial court.
Order Granting Admiral and Ocwen's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment entered by the trial court.
Appellants file three motions seeking to clarify, alter, or amend
the December 15,1998 order.
Sheriffs sale.
Expiration of the six-month redemption period.
Appellants file fourth motion seeking to set aside the foreclosure
sale or to enlarge the redemption period.
Appellants file Request for Hearing on their four motions.
Appellants withdraw their Request for Hearing.
Ocwen files Request for Hearing on Appellants' four motions.
Appellants object to Ocwen's Request for Hearing.
Ocwen files second Request for Hearing on Plaintiffs' four
motions.
Hearing on Appellants' four motions.
Court Ruling denying Appellants' four motions.
Order denying Appellants' four motions.
Notice of Appeal filed.

THE SHERIFF'S SALE EXTINGUISHED ALL RIGHT, TITLE, AND
INTERESTS OF APPELLANTS IN THE PROPERTY.
A.

Appellants Had Notice of the Sale.
1.

Notice required by Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
properly given.

Utah Code Annotated provides that judicial foreclosure sales must follow the
notice procedures outlined in Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-37-1 (2001) (stating sheriffs sales to be conducted "according to the
provisions of law relating to sales on execution."). See also David A. Thomas & James
H. Backman, supra, § 14.03(c)(6)(ii)(A) (1999) (same).

1
1

1
1
1
J
1
1
1
|

Pursuant to Rule 69(i) written notice of the time and place of sale and a
description of the property to be sold must be posted, for 21 days, on the property to be
sold, at the place of sale, and at the trial courthouse where the property is located. See
UTAH R. CIV.

P. 69(i)(l)(C). Written notice must further be published three times for

three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. See id.
Ocwen strictly complied with the notice requirements set forth above by causing the Utah
County Sheriff to post written notice of the time and place of sale and a description of the
Property (1) on the Property, (2) at the Utah County courthouse, and (3) in a Utah County
paper of general circulation.
2.

Appellants are not judgment debtors entitled to personal service.

Rule 69(i) further provides written notice must be personally served upon any and
all judgment debtors. Appellants in this case are not judgment debtors, and therefore, are
not entitled to personal service. As such, personal service was not made upon them.
In their brief, Appellants concede they are not judgment debtors, but nevertheless
argue they are in a position similar to judgment debtors and thus are entitled to personal
service under Rule 69. (Appellants Br. at 31.) In support of their position, Appellants cite
to Taubert v. Roberts, a case in which the Utah Supreme Court declared an execution sale
void for failure of the county sheriff to levy on the subject property prior to the writ of
execution return date. 747 P.2d 1046,1047 (Utah 1987). Taubert, however, is not
controlling precedent, as the plaintiff in that case was in fact the judgment debtor whose
property was being foreclosed against. In the case at hand, Appellants are not judgment
debtors, but merely individuals who claimed an interest in the Property being foreclosed

against pursuant to an order entered by the trial court in a case in which Appellants were
named as parties.
The provisions of Rule 69 are clear. If the rule drafters intended for personal service
to be made upon certain individuals in addition to judgment debtors, the rule would have
provided for such. Accordingly, Appellants have no grounds upon which to claim the
sheriffs sale should be set aside because the required notice was given and Appellants are
not judgment debtors entitled to personal service.
B.

Appellants Attended the Sale.

Appellants are further not entitled to claim the sheriffs sale should be set aside
because Appellants had notice of the sale and attended the sale. In Concepts, Inc. v. First
Security Realty Services, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court sets forth the reasons for the strict
notice requirements in foreclosure sales. See 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987).6
Specifically, the court stated as follows:
The purpose of strict notice requirements . . . is to inform persons with an
interest in the property of the pending sale of that property, so that they
may act to protect those interests. The objective of the notice is to prevent
a sacrifice of the property. If that objective is attained, immaterial errors
and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice or the sale made
pursuant thereto. A party who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside for
irregularity, want of notice, or fraud has the burden of proving his
contention, it being presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
6

Although Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah

1987) involves a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the notice requirements (and the reasons for
such notice requirements) for nonjudicial foreclosure sales and judicial foreclosure sales
are similar.

that the sale was regular. Defects in the notice of foreclosure sale that will
authorize the setting aside of the sale must be those that would have the
effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price. The
remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which reach
unjust extremes.
Id. at 1159 (citations omitted).
In the case at hand, a sheriffs sale of the Property was held on February 10,1999.
Counsel for Ocwen attended the sale and Ocwen purchased the Property for a credit bid
of $85,000. Appellants also attended the sale and made no attempt during the sale to
submit a bid on the Property or otherwise protect their alleged interests in the Property.
Accordingly, this Court should not now set aside the foreclosure sale based upon
Appellants' frivolous claims they did not receive proper notice of the sale, as they clearly
attended the sale and had ample opportunity to protect their interests.
C.

The Foreclosure Order Clearly Included All Property Interests of
Appellants.

The goal of foreclosure proceedings is to pass title to the purchaser in the subject
property, free and clear of any encumbrances. See David A. Thomas & James H.
Backman, supra, §14.03(c)(2)(iii)(A) (1999). To accomplish this all persons with
interests in the subject property that may be affected by the foreclosure sale must be
joined as necessary parties to the judicial proceeding. Id. Once all necessary parties have
been joined to the foreclosure action and a valid and enforceable sheriffs sale has taken
place, all right, title, and interest the necessary parties may have had in the subject
property are extinguished. Id.

In the present case, Ocwen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking
judgment against Epley for the entire amount owing under the Note; judgment declaring
the Deed of Trust executed by Epley to be a valid and enforceable first lien against the
Property; and judicial foreclosure of the Property barring Appellants and Epley from any
right, title, interest, lien, or estate in and to the Property, or any part thereof. Both
Appellants and Epley were necessary parties properly joined to the foreclosure
proceeding.
On December 15,1998, the trial court granted Ocwen's motion and issued an
order of sale and decree of foreclosure. As authorized by that order, on February 10,
1999, a valid and enforceable sheriffs sale was held at which Ocwen purchased the
Property. Six months later the statutory redemption period expired, with Appellants and
Epley making no attempt in the interim to redeem. As a result, all right, title and interest
Appellants and Epley in the Property has been extinguished and Appellants have no
standing in this appeal to claim a return of the Property.
D.

The Sheriff's Sale is Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds.

The statute of frauds did not prevent Ocwen from foreclosing on the Property.
Appellants allege that the quit-claim deed from Epley, as successor trustee, to Epley,
individually, is void under the statute of frauds because defendant Epley lacked authority
to convey any interest in the Property. Appellants, however, misunderstand Utah's
statute of frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 only requires that a deed conveying an
interest in land be in writing and "be subscribed by the party granting the conveyance."
Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2001). Therefore, the quit-claim deed from Epley, as
successor trustee, to Epley, individually, meets the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 255-1 because it is signed by the person granting the conveyance, Epley.
Moreover, Appellants' statute of fraud argument fails because Appellants have no
standing to bring the argument. Under Utah law, only a party to a contract or a party in
privity with a party to the contract can raise the statute of frauds defense. See Garland v.
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107,109 (Utah 1992). Appellants in this case were not a party to
any of the deeds involving Epley nor are Appellants in privity with any of the parties
named in those deeds. Therefore, Appellants' statute of frauds argument lacks merit and
they lack standing to raise the argument.
V.

APPELLANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FORGERY AND CANNOT
BENEFIT FROM IT.
Appellants have made much of their claim of forgery by Epley, an issue which the

trial court did not reach because it was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies. To
pursue their claim to invalidate the Trust Deed based on the alleged forgery in the chain of
title would allow a double recovery. However, in their arguments with respect to that issue,
Appellants have failed to mention that Appellants themselves participated in and agreed to
the signing of their father's name on the Quit-Claim Deeds in order to avoid probate and
possible tax consequences. (R. at 838,1445, p. 4; Epley Dep. at 120:17-132:15.)
Appellants have also failed to mention that their father previously executed a deed
identical to the deed forged by Epley, that the forged deed was signed for the sole purpose
of replacing the previously signed deed that could not be located, and that Epley had

permissionfromher father to sign his name on various documents, including the deed.
(Epley Dep. at 152:8-153:25.) Thus, the deed was signed wilh the father's permission and
with the approval of Appellants for the benefit of the estate of their father from which they
would all benefit. Under such circumstances, Appellants are not in a position to argue the
deed is a forgery and invalid.
Had this issue not been barred by Appellants' election of remedies, the trial court
would have then considered the issues of ratification, conspiracy, unclean hands, and
whether Admiral and Ocwen held a valid equitable mortgage even if the express Trust Deed
were voidable. Appellants witnessed the signing of the deed by their sister Epley, consented
to it, and did nothing to put any other party who might deal with the Property on notice. A
full year expired after the forgery before Epley signed the Trust Deed from which it is
obvious there was no intent to defraud anybody at the time the father's name was placed on
the deed. This fact alone constitutes a waiver by Appellants of any right to challenge the
deed and their consent to the signing of the deed constitutes an estoppel.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss Appellants' appeal for failure
to demonstrate how the issues raised on appeal were preserved in the trial court. In the
alternative, this Court should affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment in
Admiral and Ocwen's favor and affirm the decree of foreclosure and order of sale of the
Property.
DATED this 12th day of December, 2001.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
YVONNE LORRAINE CARRILLO
TAYLOR, PATRICIA ANN CARRILLO
DAVIS, and ALEXANDER JAMES
CARRILLO,
Civil No. 950400478 CV
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Plaintiffs,
vs.
LYDIA INEZ CARRILLO EPLEY; JOHN
REISSER; ADMIRAL HOME LOAN, a
California corporation, dba ADMIRAL
MORTGAGE COMPANY, OCWEN FEDERAL
BANK FSB, a federal savings bank,
Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF LYDIA INEZ CARRILLO EPLEY

May 2 9 ,

1997

Reported by
AMANDA RICHARDS, CSR
Utah CSR L i c e n s e 1070705

4t$$bUrJ

antfjteoCiaTeS

Certified Shorthand Reporters

One Utah Center, Suite 900

Taylor vs. Epley Depo: Lydia Inez Carrlllo Epley (5-29-97)

1 Deposition of LYDIA INEZ CARRILLO EPLEY, taken on bahalf

1 (continued) EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION

2 ol Plaintiffs, at 215 South Stats Street, INrtssnth

2

8-G

3 ROOT, Salt Lsks City, Utah 84111, commencing at

3

4 9:24 a m . on Thursday, May 29,1997, before

4

8-H „ "Notice Of Assignment Sale Or
Transfer Of Servicing Rights*

5 AMANDA RICHARDS, Certffled Shorthand Reporter and Notary

5

6 Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant to Notice.
7

6
7

"Payment Latter To Borrower*

w

78
78

Xpcupancy And Financial Status
Affidavit"

8-J

78

-Guaranty Of First Uen Position-

78

8-K . -Borrower's Certification &
Authorization'

78

8

8

9

9

10 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For Plaintiffs:
JEFFREY B. BROWN
BY: JEFFREY B. BROWN
11
Attorney at Law
12
4685 South Highland Driva
Suite 175
13
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

10

13

8-P

-Loan Servicing Disclosure Statement"

14

14

8-Q

-Equal Credit Opportunity Act-

15

84!

15

11
12

Attorney at Law
68 South Main Street
Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 64101

16
17
18

F

19

16
17

S b ^ ^ E R A L £ S ^ A B ? ^ « . V ANDERSON
Attorney at Law
215 South State Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

20
21

84.

"MaiHngAddreea Verification Form-

8-M

-Thirty Day Notice-

78

78

8-N

-Warranty And Compliance Agreement"

8-0

."Raquest For TatmayerIdentification
Number And Certffication"; 2 pages

-Hazard Insurance Authorization &
Requirements"

8-S

78

"M°rt9*9* Ljoan Disclosure Statement";

18

8-T

-Impound Authorizatton-

19

84J

-Impound Account AgreemenT

20

8-V

-Uniform Residential Loan

21

78
78

Application"; 4 pagas
-Borrower Instructions-

78

23

8-X

"Underwriting ApprovaT

78

24

24

8-Y

"Underwriting ApprovaT

78

25

25

8-Z

-Important Notice Concerning Document

Also Present

Patricia Davis
Alex Carrlllo

Y

4

3

6,100,155

Mr. Anderson

Mr. Marsh

2

PAGE

EXAMINATION BY

3 Lydia Inez Carrlllo

4

150

EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION

10

-Uniform Residential Loan Application-;
4pagas

2

12

3

"Note" dated June 1,1995; 3 pages

13

4

"Deed Of Trusty 6 pages

14

5

15
17

7

18

8-A

20

-Loan Policy Of True Insurance";
8 pages

8-B

Trust Agreement"; 9 pagas

23

8-F

60

100

8-C

-FadaraJTruth4n4jandiiMDisclosura
Statement" dated June 1,1995
-Itemization Of Amount Financed"

1
1
1
1

78

1
|
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1

Correspondence dated February 21,1997, 132
to Jeff Brown from Lease Day
134

I
1

11

"Quit-Claim Dead- dated 9-6-96

12

-Quit Claim Dead- dated 10-24-96

140

I

13

-Quit Claim Dead- dated 1-14-97

142

I

14

-Rental AgreemenT; 4 pagas

15

-Order And JudgmenT 9 pagas

145
147

I

1
I

14

55

"Settlement Statement"; 2 pagas

8-E

25

13

Photocopy of a fax from CFC Mortgage
to Lydia Epley dated 6-1-95; 5 pages

22
24

-Quit Claim Dead- dated 8-17-93

10

12

46

"Deed Of Trust" dated June 1,1995;
7r
84) -Note-dated June 1,1995; 2 pages

21

9

11

45

Correspondence dated January 11.1996
from Berkeley Federal to Lydia Epley

16

19

40

78
78

7

10

11

-Payoff Schedule-

6

9

34

8-BB

"Fidelity National TWe Insurance
Company Schedule A*

8

8 DEFENDANT OCWEN'S
"Uniform Residential Loan Application-;
1
9

8-AA "Escrow/Settlement Agent
Acknowledgement*
8-CC

5

5

6
7

78

1 (continued) EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
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1
2 WITNESS

78

78

8-W

23

78

78

22

22

78
78

78

78
78
78
78
78

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1S
16
17
18
19

*°
**
**
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4
^
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1

Taylor vs. Epley Depo: Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley (5-29-87)

1

Q Do you kmmrt those two debts were peid off

2 with loan proceeds?
A Yes.
3
Q Wars both of tham paid off?
4
A Yas.
5
6
Q Whathappanadtothatruck?
A it's wrecked.
7

II
Wasttlnsursd?
I 9* AQ No.
I 1 Q Whanwaaitwrackad?
I 11°
I 12 Q WasRtotalad?
I 13 A Yea.
I 14 Q Who was driving it?
I 1S A John Risaar.
I 16 Q Waa that In Wyoming?
I 17 A Yea, It waa.
1 18 Q Did ha raimbursa you for tha valua of tha
I 19 vahida?
I
A No.
I *°
21
Q On the top of Page 3 of Exhibit 2 there's
I
rafarancatothaProvorasidanca. Do you saa that?
I 24
** AQ Uh-huh,yes.
And thara's ralaranca to tha amount of
I
mortgage
liana against tha property, and it says
I **
A

1996.

22

1

|

3 waa owed to me, had stopped in June.
4

Q Explain tha money that waa owed to you.

5

A WeN, h e - w e - l e f t see. Pat and land

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

noma that had to ba paid off?
A That houaa was paid 20 yaars ago.
Q Fraa and dear?
A Yas.
Q All right And than tha naxt column ovar, do
you see, It saye^roeerentalIncome." Do you saa
that? It rater* to $800.
A Yea.
Q Waa your father's home being rented?
A No.
Q Do you know how that amount waa arrived at?
A Tha lady that gave me the loan asked me, aha
said If I put In that It waa rented that would show that
I had income to the property.
Q I see.
A And I mean It would be better for me to do It
that way.
Q So that waant baaed on any actual rental?
A No. Alex lived In the houaa.
Q And Alex waant paying any rent so far aa you

25 know?

43

1
1
1
1

9

Q When was that agreement reached?

1
1
1
I
I

10

A Altar my dad died and he moved In.

1

6 Alex and Yvonne agreed that If someone lived there they
7 would pay $100 each to each of us, or 125, and put a
8 hundred or 125 m tha bank for maintenance on tha house.

Q And did Alex make those payments for a whHa?
12
A Yeah. They stopped on me in June. 1 dont
13 know what*a happened since then.
Q June of whan?
14

11

15

A *95.

1
1
1
1

1

Q And so, roughly, he paid you a hundred to 12S
17 a month?
A Just for a month or two. (think two months.
18
19 1 think July-It was HI July.
16

1
1
1
1

20

Q So you got a couple payments?

1

21

A Uh-huh.

1

22

Q Do you IOYOW if r^'smaldnguiose payments to

24

A I dont know.

1
1
1

25

Q Do you recall who your contact was at Admiral

1

23 your sisters?

44

42

1 $55,000. Doyousaathat?
2
A Yas.
3
Q Is the*referriiigto the lien that was being
4 givantoAdmiraiorwastharaanaxistinglianontha

A Wen, he waa supposed to be paying 500 a

2 month, and that stopped. 1 mean that was the money that

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

when you went to the closing, who was there?
A Tha lady that gave me the loan at CFC
Mortgage, thafa all I knew, and than there were a few
other man there whan I signed tha signature, and I dont
remember their names.
(Defendant OCWEN'a Exhibit 3 marked
for identification.)
Q BY MR. ANDERSON: I'm handing you Exhibit 3
to your deposition, which is a note that bears the date
of June 1st, 1995. Have you seen that document before?
A Well, I guess I have. I signed It It
doeant look familiar, but there's a signature on there.
Q Is tress copy of the original, so far as you
know?
A Yes, I think so.
Q And it was signed by you on June 2nd?
A Uh-huh, yes.
Q At Guardian Title?
A Yes.
Q And do you know who prepared the document
Lydia?
A I donX I thought It waa the lady that aoid
-that gave me the money; Stephanie. I thought her name
was Jennie or Jami, but I guess It's Q Under the terms of that note, as I understand

1

1 from your lather individually Into the trust, naming
2 NmMH as tte trust**, and otter successor trust*** of
3 tte Clarence G. Carrillo trust It also app*ars to hav*
4 b**n notarized and boars tte signature of Laasa Day.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Now, tall m* how this document aquarea with
ttetestimonyyou've given.
A It looks like the same one to me as his
original.
Q Let me get at It this way: Have you ever
seen the original of this Exhibit 9 before?
A I've seen tte original that he signed the day
I went to his house, yes. If this Is It or not, I don't
know.
Q Okay. So I think maybe I misunderstood you
or you misunderstood me earlier, but on the day your
father called you at work and asked you to come to the
houaeA Yes.
Q «ttef* were documents that he signed?
A Yes.
Q And that Included a living will, the Uwt
agreement, Exhibit 7. Did It also include the original
of this Exhibit 9?
A Yes. This was one of tte papers.
Q So Cterewa* a oVe* that was .Mudetf?
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1
A Yes.
2
Q And you witnessed Nm sign tte original of
3 this Exhibit 9?

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

AY**.
Q As well as tte will and tte trust agreement?
A Yes.
Q And you took tte three of those documents,
and any others he might have signed, to work wtereL*asa
Day notarized them?
A Yes, I did.
Q And would that have been August 17th perhaps?
A Could have been. Idonlknow. I mean ft
looks Uke It is, but I don't know. I don'tremembertte
dates. I cantedyou tte month maybe, and I'm sure It
was in August
Q This is consistent with yourtestimonythat

17 you thought It was summer of *93?
18
A Yes, becaus* we *nd*d up goingtotte family
19 reunion on August 6th, 7th and 8th. Som*wtere around
20 there, tt was my dad's Milhday, and I do remember that
21
Q Now, at tte time that your father executed
22 Exhibit 7 - l e t me direct your attention back to this.
23 Thtat* the trust agreement- did you review It?
24
A Did I read It over?
25
Q Yes.
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1
A Yes. I did with my dad.
2
Q Did you discuss It with him?
3
A No. I mean I read It to him. He didn't ask
4 me any questions. Tte only question tehad was about tte
5 truck not beingfatthere, and that's because te bought
6 k, I think, before tte time that this was drawn up.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q Vttiatdkl you umferstand tte purpose of tte
trust agreement was?
A That te-tefa see. Just a second. That
before my dad died he wanted to have something set up fc
Ns kids and grandkids tobe distributed to themandso
that tte State of Utah wouldn't take any of his
possession or go Into pfobate.
Q Now, there came a time when your fatter
passed away?
A Yes.
Q And after he was put to rest there was a
meeting you told me about in a phone conversation you m
I had a few weeks back. There was a meeting at your
father's house?
A In im/fattens nous*, tte Provor*sid*no*.
Q That was a meeting attended by your sisters
and your brother as well as yourself; Is that correct?
A And tte grandkids also.
Q Give m* a date If you can. Your fetter died,

120

1 was It May 23rd? May 24th?
2
A Uh-huh.lt was.
3
Q How long after Ms passing did tMa meeting
4 occur?
5
A That weekend of - Memorial weekend we buried
6 him. H* dted on May 23rd, we buried Mm that Friday, and
7 over that weekend we were talking aboutfindingtte
8 original wW and going from there*
9
Q Was ttere son* discussion about the trust
10 agreement at that time that you couldn'tfindtte
11 original that had been eigned?
12
A Wecouldntfindany paperwork that was
13 signed.
14
Q DM you go through Urn safe at fhatftmetn
15 the house?
16
A No,ldkhrt.
17
Q Did someone else, as far as you know?
18
A Yes.
19
Q wan,tellm* about that meeting and what was
20 discussed.
21
A lthh*w*w*rehist*ittiiigstttekttcten
22 table. We were talking about we neededtofindthoee
23 papereao that my dad'a property and Msaasete wouldn't
24 go into probate. And everybody lookedforthem
25 everywhere, andte had some hiding places. Looked kit

121

i lyior ve. tpiey Depo: Lydla Inez Carrillo Epley (5-29-97)

1 taka everything*?

1 vehtelee, the traitor out in the garage. I m u n w t tort
2 his hoiise apart aftdcotikJ notfindthem.
3
Q AIKI were spouses preserrt at tMs meeting?

2

25

Q So what did you do?

1
1
1
1
1
1

Q So aomawhara thara la another varaion of
ExWbtt 7 0 0 ^ ^ 1 8 1 ^ ^ - y o u r father's wm>a on trat
version waa aignad by you?
A Yaa.
Q Right?

1
1
1
1
1

And the notary on that version is also Laaaa
Daya, but you wrote har nama?
A Yaa, 1 did.
Q So you forged the notary?

1
1
1
1

Q

8

A

1 11
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Q Waa anyonaalaa part of that daciaion?
A Everybody waa.
Q Tall me how.
A AJIthaMda.
Q Tall ma about tha diacuaaion landing up to
that
A Thara waa no discussion. ttwael either do
whatlgottodoorthay'ragoingtotaicaavafytNngfrom
my dad, the State la, and nry dad did IK* wart that
Q Did you dlecuee that with your A Yaa.
Q -slstarsandbrothar?
A Yaa.
Q Do you recall what they eald? Dtdthayagraa
Itoughttobaforgad?
A Wall, nobody didn't diaagraa.
Q DW you say, •Hara is a copy-or words to

24 that effect? "We have a copy of thie. Ifsomabody
25 doeent sign Dad'a nama to thie, the State's going to

18

1
1
1
|

Dkfyouaxpteinwhatltwaayouhadtodo?
Yaa. Thay knew what had to ba dona.
Q And ao what did you do?
9
A Sol aignad my dad'a itamef forged my dad'a
10
nama, want backtowork, forgad Laaaa'a nama, and want
12 from thara.
7

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

*°
*
Yaa.
**
You forged your father'e nama?
2**
4
A 1 did It all the time for Laaaa on har other
** documents. She was trie Investigator, t was the
A

1

Q

1
1
1

124

122

1
A We eat at the table.
2
Q Who's "we"?
3
A My lirothere, allot our Mde, all the epoueee
4 that wara thara. And I mada a daciaion to forga my dad'a
5 naniabacauaaldidnlwamthaStataofUtahtotakahia
6 things.

Q

4

7 agreement?
8
A YM.
9
Q Andthatwaaaconcarnbacauaathatmaant

15
A Yaa.
16
Q And ao what did you do about It?
17
A WeH, we k>okedta-aU of hteldde looked
18 around for h\ couldn'tfindM. At that timawa had
19 efready the uneignedcopfee that waa eeirttomy dad'a
20 houaa.
21
Q From Mr. Brown?
22
A Yaa.
23
Q Documantain that anvalopa had arrtvad?
24
A Yaa.

|

Wad, It waa-

Idont want to put words In your mouth.
A Uweent discussed as that ttwasltoW
5 ttwii^'lfl don't do what l*vs got
to
6 to taka Dad's stutT.

3

4
A Yes.
5
Q And W M there aoma apaciflc convaraatton
6 about notfindingthe original of Exhibit 7, thatruat

10 thara may hava to ba a probata?
11
A Yea.
12
Q May ba tax conaaquaneaa?
13
A Yaa.
14
Q Andallofthatwaadiacuaaad?

A

1 Investigativetechnician.Nana dWnt hava time to
2 aign It,toget them aent out I had her stamp, stamped
3 It, and I signed her name.
4
Q Trtat waa cornmon practice?
5
A In Recovery Servtcee It waa. All the
6 Invaatigatoraafidthelnveetigatto
7 aU the time.
8
Q And aha knew you did that?
9
A No. She did not know.
10
Q She didnt know on occasion you used her11
A Yea, But not on this occasion aha did not
12 know.
13
O So let ma go backtoINs meeting around the
14 kitchen table, you in front of-was Alex there?
15
A Yea.
16
Q And your two sisters wara thara?
17
A Yaa.
18
Q And they watched you sign your father'e
19 name20
A Yes, they dkl
21
22

Q - t o the trust agreement?
A To aH the paperwork.

23
Q What other paperwork waa thara?
24
A There waa another will - thara waa a will,
25 and I'm aurafhia waa -the quit daim deed, and I

J

1 thought than war* Ilka four orfivaothar papara bacauaa
2 lsfgn^acouptothf*aorfour,1lvatimas.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q Do you think-turning your attention back
toExMbtt9wMchiathaquitciaimdaadvmyquaationia
didyouaignanotharvaiaionolthatdocumantatthasama
tima? Was that Indudad in tha packet that caroa from
Mr. Brown?
A Yaa,Kwaa.
Q And at that tima, did you sign tha quitclaim
daadaawall?
A Yaah. TWa Exhibit 97
Q Yaa.
A Yaa, I did.
Q lathte-mmyouteatifladaarliaratrlkathat
Earttar you taatiflad that you obaarvad that
yourtan™**gii«d tha original olExNWt 8?
A Yaa.
Q Myquastfonthanta: la thia a copy of tha
c>riginalthatyour1atharaign^loristhl«acopyoftha

21
22
23
24
25

onatta^youloro^yourlathar'anamatoonthat
Mamoriat Day waakand?
A Idontknow. Thia looks Uka my dad's
aignatura, but It could bamina. Idontknow. Imaanl
did all my dad - l*va algnad my dad'a nama to avarything

1 found?
2
A No.
3
Q Wall,totma diract your attention to tha
4 racording data on Exhibit 9 In tha upperrighthand
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

avanwhanhawasaliva,aoldonlknowlfthlalaltor
not, b u t - I couldn't taU you. I maan It looks Uka
hia aignatura, but It also could bamina. Idontknow.
Q WaH,axplain for ma why you aay you algnad
your dad's nama.
A Bacauaa I took cara of a lot of his buainaaa
for him.
Q Not forging chacks or doing aomathing
dtehonaatbutA WaN,Htharaconaidafaddiahonaat,lguaaa
ao bacauaa I did aign hia monay ordars somatimaa or
paperwork of his. Hajuataaidsignlt
Q But not for your own banaflt Thafa what
I'm asking.
A No. Idldltlbrmydadwlmhtepafinission.
Q Thafa what I waa asking.
So you'ra not aura, Lydia,lf thia Exhibit 9
la tha original copy of tha original or tha onathatwaa
algnad by you?
A I don't Imaanl know for aura that all tha
othar things in hara is my writing, bacauaa I llllad all
trMapotemaxcapthiaaignatufa.butldon'tknowif
this Is his signature or HITa my aignatura.
Q WasthaofHrinalofthaqultcialmd^dha
algnad that day ha callad you from work, was that avar
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cornar on tha trdrd Una thara's s ra<XKdlng data that
says 1994 May 31. Do you aaa that?
A Yaa, I aaa.
Q So tMaaxMMt, tha original of thia
Exhibit 9 was racordad after your fatharpaaaad away?
A Right
Q Do you racaN racording tha original of tha
quit daim daadthat you forgad your fathar'a nama to
that Mamorial Day waakand? Somatima after that you
racordad It?
A Youknowwhatl-l-ltcoukiba, I
dont know. I ramambar taking Pat, and I had a bunch of
paperwork, down to tha county dark's; and I maan thia
could hava baan ona. Could hava been.
Q Tha only wayA Idontknow. I maan I really don't I
dWnt avanknow It waaatampad or anything. I raairy
dont know. I dont I mean Q You never found tha original that your father
algnad?
A Of thia (indicating)?

1
2
3

Q This (Indicating).
A No.
Q So woutdntth* suggest this was tha one

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

that ww forgad?
A Could be. I mean It looks Q Otharwlaa, aomaona hadtofind It after your
father died ajKlfecotd It May 31at of 1994.
A Rlgrs\ I maan I dont know If tha originate
wars found or what Idontknow. I maan i coukfnt
tell you. This could hatha forga.thia could bahia

11 writing. Idontknow.
12
lmaana1iltaK>wtewatookpapaiwork,took
13 kovartrwra to tha county dark's, thaystempad It
14 whatavarthaydldtoltajKlwawaragona. Imaanl
15 -dont know. I coukfnt 16
Q Your brothar knaw that you had dona thia?
17
18

A Yaa.
Q Your sisters knaw that you had dona thia?

19
20

A Yaa.
Q Did you avartellGuardian Tltto Company that

21 you had dona thia?
22
A No.
23
Q Did you avar tell24
A I dldntteH anybody.
25
Q DMyouavartellJamlorJannlofCFC?
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2
3
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A No.
Q Did you aver tail Admiral?
A No.
Q Did you avar tall Barkalay?
A No.
Q OrOCWEN?
A No.
Q No ona knaw axcapt you and your family?
A Yes.
Q Now, ol to original of the trust agreement,
Exhibit 7 that you forgad your father's neroe to, what
happened to that document? Do you still havatha
original in Wyoming?
A Yes, I do.
Q Wars copies made for your brother and
sisters?
A Yes, they were.
Q So they got copies of It?
A Yes, they did.
Q Did they get copies of the will as well?
A They got copies of everything that I forged.
Q You forged them, took them to your workplace
where you had access to Lease's notary seal or stamp;
correct?
A Yeajdkf.

Inez Carrillo Epley (5-29-97)

1 forging these documents at your father's kitchen table in

I

2 the home that you grew up In, did anyone around the table

I
I

3 say. "Lydia, don't do this. This Is wrong"?

7

A
Q
A
Q

8

A Yesjdid.

4
5
6

1

Q And after you finished that, you made copies?

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A Yes.
Q Did you ever send a signed set back to
Mr. Brown?
A No.ldWnX
Q Other than that one phone conversation with
Mr. Brown, did you aver talk to Mm about the trust
agreement, the will or other documents?
A Nojdkfart.
Q And have you ever spoken to anyone else about
thia except for your family members?
A Yes. When they started taking me to court
I talked to a few lawyers about It whan I started getting
myQ Wageagarniahed?
A - wages garnished, started serving me,
coming to my work. Yes, I did.
Q You consulted counsel on your behalf?
A I went in Ilka for a one free hour
consultation to Just find out, you know, what kind of
trouble I would be in.
Q At the time you were signing these documents.

131

I
I
I
I

I

Q And waa there any discussion after you gave
10 them their copies?

I

9

I

11

A No.

I

12

Q DW anyone say, "Donl record IT?

I

A No. They didn't say to or not to record K.
14 They didnt say anything. It was like it was already a
15 dona deal In our ayes.
13

Have you discussed this with Lease Day?
I 1167 AQ The
I 18 Q Yes.forgad ones?
I 19 A No.lhavenX
I
(Defendant OCWEN's Exhibit 10 marked
21
forkfentffication.)
I
MR. ANDERSON: Let me hand you Exhibit 10,
I **a and Qask BY
you to review that for a moment
I
complies.)
I 24 AQ (witness
Have you eeen the original or copy of that
I ^
20
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2
A Yes, I did.
3
Q And distributed those copies to your brother
4 and sisters?

No.
No one tried to stop you?
No.
You did it in plain view of everyone?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

letter before?
A Nojhawrt.
Q Thafs a latter bearing the signature,
purportedly, of Lease Day to Jeff Brown; right?
A Looks like that's what K is.
Q Dated February 21st of 1997.
A Yea.
Q Let ma direct your attention to the second
paragraph where aha says, I t Is not my practice to" l a not my practice nor have I ever in the past notarized
a document Improperly".
Is that accurals, as far as you know?
A I donl think It is,
Q Because of the eeveral times in the ordinary
courseof business at the State of Utah you notarized or
you did the notarization on her behalf, right?
A Yea, I have. And It was more than several
times.
Q Okay. Thafs why you would dispute that
first sentence?
A Yes.
Q "Lydia Epley was a coworker with whom I was
placedtoa supervisory position."
Did you supervise her?
A No.

I
I
1
1
1

1
1
I
I
1
1
I
1

|

Taylor vs. Epky Depo: Lydla Inez Carrlllo Epiay (5-20-07)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

A it's not his. I know it's not hia.
Q But you didnt sign his name to it?
A I didn't
Q Do you know who did?
A Somaona, but I dont know. Ihadaomaona
aign it, but I dont know who It was.
Q You aakad aomaona to a4gn Max's nama to It?
A Or It could ba mlna. I don't know. Imaanl
could havaalgnad It or I could hava aakad aomaona to
sign it I dont know.
Q That was to facilitate the loan?
A No, that wasn't That waa to add mora Income
for ma aa - 1 maan Q To qualify lor tha loan?
A Yes, exactly.
Q Now, in thte lawsuit there is a judgraem that

17 was obtalnad against you in favor of Yvonne, Pat, and
18 Alex. You'ra awara of that?
19
20

A Oh, yaa, I am.
Q And la It accurate to say that tha antira

21 amount of that judgmant la ovar $81,000?
22
A Trtat*e what they have, but I guess there's 23 thara'a punitive and othar damages. I dont know.
24
Q I'm handing you 25
A I dont know what thay want

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

I

13 hare.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

14
Q Look at theteatpage.
15
MR. MARSH: Ifs a Wank copy.
16
MR. ANDERSON: Oh, is It? Apparently that*a
17 unaignad.
18
Q Hava you aaan a aignad varaton?
19
A No,lhawrt.
20
Q In connactionwnh that (udgment, your wagaa
21 are preaanttybalng garnished by your brother and

I

22 aisters?
23
A Yes.
24
Q And how often do thay do that?
25
A Every pay day, avary Friday, tomorrow la pay

I
I

I

(Dafandant OCWEN'a Exhibit 15 markad
forldaiitffication.)
Q BY MR. ANDERSON: I'm handing you Exhibit 15,
whichiaanordarand|udgmantantaradinthtscasa.
A Yes, I hava a copy.
Q And according to that document, what la tha
amount of Judgmant?
A Tha amount of tha Judgmant is $81,079.83.
Q And when was it entered? What's tha date K
waa aignad by tha fudge?
A I dont hava a data on hare. I dont hava a
Judga'a-1 dont hava a judga'a signature or data on

day and there will ba a garnishment on It
Q And how much la each garnishment?
A Twenty-five percent of my earnings.
Q So approxlrnater/how much per pay period?
A Well, on a 40-hour pay period I think It'a
$214 or $208. In tha summer I put in a lot of overtime,
ar*H think ~ two weaks ag^ FrMay my last paycheck^
hax!39houreofovartinia,andlthinkthaytook300and
aoffiathing. I hava the check stub.
Q How much hava thay garnished to data ainca
the judgment waa entered?
A A years'worth of wages. I couldnttellyou
how much, but a years' worth of wagaa.
Q Ovar $5,000?
A H that's whatftadds up to, that's what it
could ba.
Q Do you know where that money's going?
A I thought It waa going to pay tha houaa
payment
Q ThaA ThaQ Tha loan?
A Tha Provoresidence,yaa.
Q Thought It waa going to Berkeley or OCWEN?
A Yes, I did.

1
Q Or whoever heW that loan?
2
A Yaa, I did.
3
Q Did your brother or aiatere ever tall you
4 thet?
5
A I dont talk to them. IJust assumed that
6 Thaifa what I assumed they took the Judgment for waa to
7 pay tha houaa payments.
8
Q Do you have amy idaa what the fair market
9 valua of tha Provoresidenceis today?
10
A NoJoWt
11
Q You dont know If It'a Incraasad In value?
12
A IckMrt.
13
Q Haaany probata bean commenced in connaction
14 with tha Provo property?
15
A As far as I know, no, but I dont know. I
16 mea<ilhavenotaciuawhat'agoingonwithlt
17
Q You're not being consulted Hit is?
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A Exactly. Since I've aignad tha quit cteim
daad ovar to them, I'm -tha only thing that they're
concerning ma with anything is tha garntehmant
Everything etee I dont know.
Q And whan you daadad tha property back to them
4tthacourihouaa,tharewMftoreductkMof
amount?
A No, there waanX
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1

1 sign it, would you understand John would sign his own
2 name as the tenant or ha would forge Alex's name as the
3 tenant?

MR. ANDERSON: ThaTe all I have for now.

2
THE WITNESS: Do you want thasabadc?
3
MR. MARSH: I've got a law questions. Idoot
4 know HyouYe got any.

4
THE WITNESS: He would forge Alex'a name to do It,
5 butJohndidntdolt I know that for a fact He
6 dWnl want to have anything to do with It Either I dW
7 It or I had someone else sign It
8
Q BY MR. MARSH: You mentioned, Lydla, that you

5
MR. BROWN: No.
6
MR. ANDERSON: HoWon. Mr. Mafmh ia going to ask
7 soma follow-up questions.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

EXAMINATION
BY MR. MARSH:
Q Talking about that Exhibit 14, you've said
that Aiax did not sign that but you think mayba aomabody
alsadid?
A Oh, I kiiow someone else did, becauee I called
JannteandltoWhsrthatl-youknow.lcouldnnflnd
Mm or gat a hold of Mm to eignit, and that's whan aha
taxed m« this paperrighth«rs(liKlteatif>g) and saW to
ask John or somebody else to sign it; so I did.
Q JohnRtsser?

20
A Rissar, yes.
21
Q This is Jam! at CFC that asked you to find
22 John or somebody else to sign It?
23
A Yes.
24
Q And did youfindsomebody else to sign it?
25
A Either I found someone else to sign It or I
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1 signed It myself.
2
Q Ami that was at the request otJsmi at CFC?
3
A Yea. I have the paperworkrighthare.
4
Q But she knew that you couldn't find Alex to
5 sign It?
6
A No, aha didirt. No. We never talked about
7 IL

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q But I thought you fust said that she-that
you had told her you coukmt find Alex.
A Yes. And she aeked me If I would either have
John or someone else sign It, and nothing was said attar
that There was a signed ~ s signed paper on tt. And
she didn't ask me, -Well, did you find your brother, did
you have someone elee sign IT. She didnl say anything.
Q But sriedM ask you to have John or somebody
else sign It lor Alex?
A Yea.
Q And you did that?
A YesJdTd.
MR. ANDERSON: Just interject
For Alex or for themselves as a potential
tenant?
THE WITNESS: For me to have the income of $800 to
qualify for the loan.
M a ANDERSON: I understand. If you got John to

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

last years; was trot correct?
A In the past from the time -from 1973 to
1994, yes.
Q Okay. And did you feel like you had your
father's permission to sign tMngs for Mm?
A I did have Ma permission to sign tMngs for
Mm up until the day he died.
Q Did you have thM in mind when you made the
decision to sign your fathers name to the trust
agreement?
A Yes, I did.
Q West your intent when you eigned that trust
egreemeMreailytoiustmafcearecordof adocumeMthat
you already knew had been signed by Mm?
A Yes, It was.
Q That was be<»use the original couldn't be
found?
A Exactly.
Q So m doing that you had no intent to cheat
anybody?
A At the time, no, I didnX And then when I

22
23
24
25

found out how much trouble I waam because I owed so
many peopieaiid I waatuad of getting im^
my wages garnished, I did It butthetwae my only-at
that time I thought that was my only way out
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signed your dad's name to everything when he was stJU
alive, with his permission. I think those ware your
words. I may be mistaken.
A No,ldWnT I mean like Q DW you sign lots ot things for him with his
permission?
A Oh, yes, I did.
Q How many things; can you remember?
A 20,30,40,50. Since I was 18,
Q Do you remember what some otthoeetMngs
might have bean?
A Money orders, Ma CFW updating, Ma CFW card,
his Eegles papers to get Into the Eagles. Just stuff he
didnl want to deal with I did.
Q And you dW that at his request?
A Yes, I did.
Q AiKltfa* was Wnd ots regular thing In those

r*—-

